Trump’s Transactional Patience: A View from the Edge of the Crisis

    For decades, the conflict between Israel and Iran has been defined by indirection: covert operations, cyberattacks, and proxy warfare. That era may have ended in April 2026, when the two nations exchanged direct strikes for the first time. Iranian missiles landed on Israeli soil; Israeli jets struck targets near Isfahan. The so-called shadow war has given way to something more visible, and more dangerous.

    As this new phase unfolds, one figure looms over the diplomatic landscape, even from the sidelines: former President Donald J. Trump. Though out of office, he remains a serious contender for the presidency in 2029. His attitude toward the escalating Israel-Iran conflict is therefore not merely a matter of historical interest. It could shape the next American administration’s policies at a critical moment.

    To observers in capitals that depend on the free flow of Middle Eastern energy and the predictability of the American alliance system, Mr. Trump’s approach appears consistent with his long-held worldview. It is transactional, pragmatic, and focused on personal legacy. It is not rooted in ideological opposition to Iran or in a grand vision of regional stability. Instead, it treats the crisis as a problem to be managed for maximum political advantage.

    A Transactional View of Conflict

    To understand Mr. Trump’s position, one must first set aside conventional diplomatic categories. He is neither a hawk nor a dove in the traditional sense. He does not speak of containment, deterrence, or balance of power. His foreign policy thinking has always revolved around deals, costs, and benefits. In his view, international conflicts are not moral dramas but negotiations waiting to happen.

    This is evident in how he has discussed the current Israel-Iran escalation. According to people familiar with his private conversations—including Republican donors and foreign envoys who have spoken with him—Mr. Trump has consistently framed the crisis as a failure of the current administration. He has called it “Biden’s war” or “Harris’s mess,” depending on who occupies the White House. His instinct is not to intervene immediately, but to let events unfold, and then step in as a dealmaker once the parties are exhausted.

    In this sense, Mr. Trump’s attitude can be summarized as escalation for negotiation. He appears to believe that a controlled degree of conflict—provided it does not spiral into a regional conflagration—can create leverage. That leverage, in turn, could be used to force a grand bargain with Iran: a deal that would limit its nuclear program and curb its regional influence, all under the Trump brand.

    How Israel and Iran See Trump

    Both Jerusalem and Tehran have taken note of this posture, and each has drawn its own conclusions.

    Iranian strategists, including those close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, likely see Mr. Trump as a double-edged sword. On one hand, he was the president who assassinated Qassem Soleimani in 2020 and withdrew from the nuclear agreement. On the other hand, they perceive him as less inclined to wage a full-scale war than some of his Democratic successors. War is unpredictable; unpredictability is bad for business—and Mr. Trump is above all a businessman. A major Gulf conflict would send oil prices soaring, trigger an economic downturn, and complicate any political comeback. Tehran may therefore be testing the limits of this calculation, launching calibrated strikes to see how far it can push without provoking a decisive American response.

    Israel’s view is more nuanced. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government remembers the Trump years as a high point in bilateral relations: the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Golan Heights annexation, the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. But there is also a lingering sense of uncertainty. Toward the end of Mr. Trump’s first term, he reportedly urged Israel to “do what you have to do” against Iran while offering no explicit commitment of American military support.

    That pattern appears to be repeating. According to Israeli officials who have communicated with Trump associates (and who spoke on condition of anonymity), the former president’s message is one of political backing rather than military partnership. He is willing to provide diplomatic cover and weapons sales, but the fighting, he implies, is Israel’s responsibility. This is not isolationism, but a form of burden-sharing—or, some might say, burden-shifting.

    The View from the Indo-Pacific

    For a country like the one this analyst calls home—an island nation heavily reliant on imported energy and deeply integrated into the global trading system—this approach invites unease, though not alarm. Such a nation is not a direct party to the Israel-Iran conflict, but it has deep interests at stake. It imports the vast majority of its oil from the Middle East, most of it passing through the Strait of Hormuz. An uncontrolled war between Israel and Iran could disrupt those shipments, raise energy prices, and strain an already fragile economy. Moreover, its security alliance with the United States—the foundation of its postwar foreign policy—would be tested in unfamiliar ways.

    Mr. Trump’s transactional view of alliances is well documented. During his first term, he openly questioned why certain allies, including those in East Asia, did not contribute more to the cost of hosting American troops. He withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. He often spoke of allies as clients. In a new Israel-Iran war, a policymaker in such a country might reasonably wonder: if an Iranian attack damages a tanker flying its flag, would a future Trump administration come to its aid under the mutual security treaty? Or would it expect that nation to handle the matter on its own?

    These are not purely speculative concerns. In 2019, after attacks on tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, the Trump administration blamed Iran but did not take military action. One of the damaged vessels was operated by a company from that same island nation. The response from Washington was measured. That episode may offer a glimpse of how a second Trump term could handle a similar crisis: supportive in rhetoric, restrained in action.

    For nations that strive to maintain a neutral stance in the Middle East while relying on the United States for security, this creates a delicate balancing act. They cannot assume that American power will always be deployed to stabilize the region. They must prepare for the possibility that a future president might see regional turbulence as a source of leverage rather than a problem to be solved.

    The Nuclear Question

    Perhaps the most serious issue is Iran’s nuclear program. Since Mr. Trump left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, Iran has steadily advanced its enrichment capacity. It is now widely considered a threshold nuclear state, capable of building a weapon in a short time if it chooses to do so.

    In the current wave of conflict, Israeli leaders have publicly discussed the possibility of preemptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. How would Mr. Trump respond to such an action? His public statements have been somewhat contradictory. He has said he does not want a third world war, but he has also insisted that Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. These two positions could come into direct conflict if Israel strikes and Iran retaliates.

    A careful reading of Mr. Trump, based on his first term and his public comments since leaving office, suggests that he would seek to avoid direct American military involvement. He would likely increase sanctions, offer diplomatic support to Israel, and try to mediate a ceasefire—but he would not order American missiles to be fired unless American forces were directly attacked. He is, at heart, a dealmaker, not a commander of large-scale military campaigns. He prefers to leave his mark on buildings and agreements, not on battlefields.

    That said, hesitation carries its own risks. If Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and Iran responds with attacks on American bases in the Gulf, Mr. Trump would face a crisis that no amount of dealmaking could easily resolve. In that moment, his instinct might be to blame the previous administration, to demand that Israel bear the consequences, and to seek a rapid de-escalation. Whether such a strategy would work in practice is far from certain.

    Conclusion: Living with Uncertainty

    For an observer in a country that has long championed non-proliferation, free trade, and multilateral cooperation—but that lacks the military capacity to secure its own energy lifelines—Mr. Trump’s attitude toward the Israel-Iran conflict is not a source of panic. But it is a source of serious reflection.

    He does not reject American leadership altogether. Rather, he redefines it in narrower, more self-interested terms. Allies are not partners in a shared enterprise; they are customers who must pay for services rendered. Conflicts are not threats to global order; they are opportunities to make deals. And the ultimate measure of foreign policy success is not stability or human security, but whether it advances the president’s political fortunes.

    In the new wave of the Israel-Iran conflict, Mr. Trump sees a potential opening. He could return to office and present himself as the only leader capable of cleaning up the crisis left by others. He could try to broker a nuclear freeze or a broader regional accord, perhaps even putting his name on it. These are not impossible outcomes.

    But the path to such an outcome is fraught. And for countries that depend on steady energy flows, predictable alliances, and a functioning international order—without the power to shape that order on their own—the uncertainty inherent in Mr. Trump’s approach is a challenge to be managed, not a catastrophe to be feared. We watch, we analyze, and we prepare for multiple futures. In a world of rising great-power rivalry and regional conflict, that may be the most any neutral observer can do.